CISA recommends turning on two Windows event logs and keeping each one with a retention period of at least 180 days. That figure is a floor, so 180 days is the minimum your firm should meet, and any longer period is a decision you make on top of it.
Chief takeaways
- Turn on both logs before anything else, because a retention period does nothing for a log that is not recording.
- Set retention to at least 180 days on each of the two logs, on every Windows system you manage.
- Confirm that PowerShell is version 5.0 or later, since older versions may leave no usable record.
- Move servers to Windows Server 2019 and workstations to Windows 10 or greater where you can, and enable Protected Process Light on Windows Server 2012R2.
Why 180 days is the floor for two logs
CISA's #StopRansomware Guide states the core recommendation in one sentence: "The authoring organizations recommend turning on these two Windows Event Logs with a retention period of at least 180 days." That sentence has three parts, and a firm that keeps logs on file needs to handle each one.
The first part is that the logs must be turned on. A retention period is a setting on a log, so it protects nothing on a log that is switched off. Before you think about days, confirm that both logs are recording on every Windows machine in scope, including the file server, the bookkeeping workstations, and any laptop used for remote work.
The second part is the word "least." The guide sets 180 days as a minimum. It does not say that 180 days is the right length for every office, and it does not limit how long you may keep the logs. A firm that keeps them for a year meets the recommendation. A firm that keeps them for a few weeks does not, because that is well short of 180 days.
The third part is the count: two logs. Each machine needs both logs checked on its own.
The window matters because intrusions do not always show damage on the day they start, so the earliest entries may be the ones you need most. A 180-day minimum gives your team a long look back when someone asks what happened in a given month.
Which Windows versions can meet the target
Its note reads: "Note: The authoring organizations recommend organizations upgrade to Windows Server 2019 and Windows 10 or greater." Read plainly, that gives you two floors for a mixed fleet: Windows Server 2019 for servers, and Windows 10 or greater for desktops and laptops.
The phrase "or greater" matters. Windows 10 is the floor for workstations, and any newer release meets the same recommendation. Because the guide says upgrade, the older machines are the ones to replace or move first. Your inventory should list the operating system and version of every machine before you set a single retention value, since that list decides which machines need work first.
The guide also addresses one older server directly. Its second quote reads: "For Windows Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light (PPL) for Local Security Authority (LSA)." The guide gives the step, not the reason, so for that server the action is a configuration to enable rather than an upgrade. The table below sets the three named platforms side by side so you can sort your machines by what each one needs.
| Platform named in the guide | Action the guide recommends |
|---|---|
| Windows Server 2019 | Upgrade to this version |
| Windows 10 or greater | Upgrade to this version or newer |
| Windows Server 2012R2 | Enable Protected Process Light (PPL) for LSA |
Sort each machine into one of these rows before you set retention on it.
PowerShell logs before version 5.0
Among the logging gaps the guide names, PowerShell is the one to check first. The guide says: "Logs from Windows PowerShell prior to version 5.0 are either non-existent or do not record enough detail to aid in enterprise monitoring and incident response activities." The sentence sets a version line at 5.0 and gives two outcomes for anything below it. Either there are no logs, or the logs lack the detail needed for enterprise monitoring and incident response.
That changes how you read the retention figure. A 180-day setting on a PowerShell log that does not exist keeps nothing.
Compare the major version number in the result against 5.0. Record the result in the same inventory you use for Windows versions, so each machine appears once with its operating system and its PowerShell version side by side.
For machines below 5.0, the fix is an upgrade to a version at or above that line. Track that upgrade alongside the operating system work from the previous section, so the two changes happen on the same schedule. Keep a short list of the machines that still fall below the line, and recheck each one after the change is made.
Federation protocols with AES-256
The word "Instead" marks this as a replacement. Treat the list as the standard the guide wants met, not as a closed set.
For a firm, the question is where authentication happens. List the applications that sign staff in, including the accounting package, the document portal, and any remote access gateway. For each one, identify the login method it uses and whether that method is one of the modern federation protocols the guide names. For any application that relies on an older method, plan the move to a named protocol and test the change before it reaches staff.
Keep the retention setting in place through the change, so the records from before and after the move both stay on file.
NTLM auditing for NTLMv2 only
The guide's last authentication step is a logging instruction: "Enable NTLM auditing to ensure that only NTLMv2 responses are sent across the network."
The sentence has a method and a goal. The goal is that only NTLMv2 responses cross the network. The guide wants you to use auditing to confirm the goal, not to assume it.
The guide's wording means the audit should show NTLMv2 and nothing else. Read the audit output with that test in mind. If the records show responses other than NTLMv2, the setting has found something to fix.
Auditing is useful only when its records remain on file. So the NTLM setting and the two-log retention setting depend on each other.
Five-year records in Washington
Not every retention rule comes from a security guide. The WAC 458-20-254 text reads: "All records must be open for inspection and examination at any time by the department, upon reasonable notice, and must be kept and preserved for a period of five years."
That sentence contains three separate requirements. The records must stay open for inspection and examination at any time. The department may inspect them on reasonable notice. And the records must be kept and preserved for five years. The five-year period is the part most readers will remember, but the other two requirements describe what keeping records means in practice: the records must remain available, not just stored somewhere.
Read the quote carefully before you apply it. It speaks of "records" and "the department." It does not mention Windows, event logs, or security monitoring. The CISA guide sets a 180-day minimum for two logs, and the Washington rule sets five years for the records it covers. These are different rules for different materials, and neither replaces the other. Pointing to a 180-day log setting does not satisfy a five-year record rule, and the log guidance should not be read as a five-year requirement.
If any of your firm's files fall under a rule like this one, write down which section governs them, how long they must be kept, and who in the office can produce them on short notice. Those three items turn a general statement into a working procedure. The log question stays separate. It concerns how long system activity records remain on the machines you manage.
Retention holds can keep deleted items
Deleting something does not always mean it is gone. Its support article on managing trash states: "Due to asynchronous processing, some deleted items may return to your trash if Box determines that they cannot be deleted due to a Retention or Legal Hold policy."
Two ideas in that sentence matter beyond Box. The first is that a retention or legal hold policy can block deletion. Someone who clicks delete may expect the item to disappear, but a hold tells the system to keep it. The second is the word "asynchronous." The article says the deletion may be processed in the background, so the result is not always immediate. An item that looks removed may reappear in the trash later, after the system checks whether a hold applies.
Box is a different product from Windows, and this article does not describe how Windows handles event logs. Do not carry Box's behavior over to your servers. What does carry over is a general habit: before you assume a record is gone, check whether a hold applies to it. A deletion that appears to succeed may not be final, and a hold that someone set may be the reason.
For a firm, this means keeping a short record of which holds are active, who set them, and what they cover. The same check is useful when you change log settings, because a clean-up that ignores holds can remove records the firm meant to keep.
Comparing retention options side by side
The sources in this post offer three retention ideas, and each answers a different question. Put them side by side before you choose.
| Option | Figure from the source | What it applies to | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| CISA log retention target | At least 180 days | Two Windows event logs | CISA #StopRansomware Guide |
| Washington records rule | Five years | Records the department may inspect | WAC 458-20-254 |
| Box retention hold | No fixed period stated | Deleted items that a hold blocks | Box support article |
The first row is the only one that addresses Windows event logs, and its figure is a minimum. The second row sets a fixed period, but for a different kind of record, as the Washington rule describes. The third row gives no period at all. It describes a condition that can keep an item in place regardless of when it was deleted, so it is a safeguard rather than a duration.
Because the rows answer different questions, they do not compete with each other. Your firm may need several of them at once: a log period for the machines, a longer period for any records the Washington rule covers, and a check for holds before anything is removed. The practical error is to treat one row as a substitute for another, such as assuming a log setting satisfies a records rule, or assuming that a hold is unnecessary because a log period is set.
Which one should you pick?
For the Windows event logs on your systems, pick the CISA target. Its guide says the authoring organizations "recommend turning on these two Windows Event Logs with a retention period of at least 180 days," as stated in the #StopRansomware Guide. Set 180 days as the minimum on each of the two logs, on every Windows machine you manage, and treat anything longer as a choice you make on top of that floor.
Do not pick the five-year figure for those logs. The Washington rule does not mention logs, so it cannot be used to justify a log setting, and the log setting cannot be used to satisfy the rule. If your firm holds records that the rule covers, handle them under their own procedure with their own period.
Holds are not a choice between options. They are a separate safeguard that works alongside whichever period you set. Before any deletion or clean-up, check for active holds, and treat a deletion as unconfirmed until you have checked again. A firm that sets the 180-day log period and also checks for holds has covered both the time a record is kept and the risk that it is removed early.
Setting the retention window on your systems
Start with an inventory. List every Windows machine, its operating system version, and its PowerShell version. The CISA guide gives the points that matter for this list, and the table below pulls the figures from its text so you can check each machine against them.
| Setting | Value from the guide | Where it appears |
|---|---|---|
| Event log retention period | At least 180 days on each of two logs | Two Windows Event Logs |
| PowerShell version | 5.0 or later | Logs from earlier versions may be missing or lack detail |
| Windows Server | 2019 (upgrade recommended) | Server upgrade recommendation |
| Windows 10 | Version 10 or greater | Workstation upgrade recommendation |
For each machine, first confirm that both logs are turned on. A retention period does nothing for a log that is not recording. Next, set the retention period to at least 180 days on each of the two logs. Then check PowerShell. The guide says earlier versions either leave no logs or lack enough detail, so confirm the version is at or above 5.0 and record the result in the inventory.
Enable NTLM auditing as well. The guide's aim, in its words, is to "[e]nable NTLM auditing to ensure that only NTLMv2 responses are sent across the network," and the audit only helps if its records are kept.
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Reader questions
Is 180 days the maximum I should keep event logs? No. The guide's wording is "at least 180 days," so 180 days is the minimum. The guide does not set an upper limit, and any longer period is a decision your firm makes.
Do I need to upgrade every server to Windows Server 2019 right away? The guide recommends that organizations "upgrade to Windows Server 2019 and Windows 10 or greater." It states the recommendation but does not set a deadline, so the timing is up to your firm. Start with the oldest machines in your inventory.
Does the five-year rule in Washington apply to my event logs? The rule in WAC 458-20-254 speaks of records open to the department and kept for five years. It does not mention event logs, so it does not set a period for them. Check the full section before applying it to any of your files.
What if a machine runs a PowerShell version below 5.0? The guide says that logs from PowerShell "prior to version 5.0 are either non-existent or do not record enough detail to aid in enterprise monitoring and incident response activities." Upgrade that machine to version 5.0 or later, then recheck it.
Is Windows Server 2012R2 covered by the guide? The guide gives a specific step for it: "For Windows Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light (PPL) for Local Security Authority (LSA)." The same page recommends upgrades for the newer platforms, so 2012R2 gets the configuration step instead.
If I delete something, is it always removed? Check for active holds before you assume a deletion is final, and confirm again afterward.
Do I need both logs turned on, or is one enough? The guide's recommendation names two logs, so both should be turned on with the retention period set. Turning on only one leaves the other unrecorded, and a retention setting cannot protect a log that is off.